A reference to a function in a "var _ = ..." init-time
initialization keeps the symbol live. Move references to
Config.EncryptTicket and Config.DecryptTicket into tests.
These references increase the size of an unused import of
crypto/tls by about 1MiB.
Change-Id: I6d62a6dcbd73e22972a217afcda7395e909b52cc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/498595
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
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This change updates the makeClientHello logic to only advertise TLS
1.3 ciphers when tls.Config.MinVersion is set to tls.VersionTLS13
(i.e the client only supports TLS 1.3). Previously, TLS 1.2 ciphers
would be included in the client hello message.
Fixes#57771
Change-Id: Ife4123037b0a4609578ffffb1cdf1e1d4e0a8df6
GitHub-Last-Rev: 45f4275
GitHub-Pull-Request: #49293
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/360794
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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We used to inconsistently run certificate verification on the server on
resumption, but not on the client. This made TLS 1.3 resumption pretty
much useless, as it didn't save bytes, CPU, or round-trips.
This requires serializing the verified chains into the session ticket,
so it's a tradeoff making the ticket bigger to save computation (and for
consistency).
The previous behavior also had a "stickyness" issue: if a ticket
contained invalid certificates, they would be used even if the client
had in the meantime configured valid certificates for a full handshake.
We also didn't check expiration on the client side on resumption if
InsecureSkipVerify was set. Again for consistency, we do that now.
Also, we used to run VerifyPeerCertificates on resumption even if
NoClientCerts was set.
Fixes#31641
Change-Id: Icc88269ea4adb544fa81158114aae76f3c91a15f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/497895
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
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Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
All OpenSSL tests now test operation with EMS. To test a handshake
*without* EMS we need to pass -Options=-ExtendedMasterSecret which is
only available in OpenSSL 3.1, which breaks a number of other tests.
Updates #43922
Change-Id: Ib9ac79a1d03fab6bfba5fe9cd66689cff661cda7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/497376
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Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
There was a bug in TestResumption: the first ExpiredSessionTicket was
inserting a ticket far in the future, so the second ExpiredSessionTicket
wasn't actually supposed to fail. However, there was a bug in
checkForResumption->sendSessionTicket, too: if a session was not resumed
because it was too old, its createdAt was still persisted in the next
ticket. The two bugs used to cancel each other out.
For #60105Fixes#19199
Change-Id: Ic9b2aab943dcbf0de62b8758a6195319dc286e2f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496821
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
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Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Ever since session ticket key rotation was introduced in CL 9072, we've
been including a prefix in every ticket to identify what key it's
encrypted with. It's a small privacy gain, but the cost of trial
decryptions is also small, especially since the first key is probably
the most frequently used.
Also reissue tickets on every resumption so that the next connection
can't be linked to all the previous ones. Again the privacy gain is
small but the performance cost is small and it comes with a reduction in
complexity.
For #60105
Change-Id: I852f297162d2b79a3d9bf61f6171e8ce94b2537a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496817
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
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When server and client have mismatch in curve preference, the server will
send HelloRetryRequest during TLSv1.3 PSK resumption. There was a bug
introduced by Go1.19.6 or later and Go1.20.1 or later, that makes the client
calculate the PSK binder hash incorrectly. Server will reject the TLS
handshake by sending alert: invalid PSK binder.
Fixes#59424
Change-Id: I2ca8948474275740a36d991c057b62a13392dbb9
GitHub-Last-Rev: 1aad9bc
GitHub-Pull-Request: #59425
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/481955
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
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Message marshalling makes use of BytesOrPanic a lot, under the
assumption that it will never panic. This assumption was incorrect, and
specifically crafted handshakes could trigger panics. Rather than just
surgically replacing the usages of BytesOrPanic in paths that could
panic, replace all usages of it with proper error returns in case there
are other ways of triggering panics which we didn't find.
In one specific case, the tree routed by expandLabel, we replace the
usage of BytesOrPanic, but retain a panic. This function already
explicitly panicked elsewhere, and returning an error from it becomes
rather painful because it requires changing a large number of APIs.
The marshalling is unlikely to ever panic, as the inputs are all either
fixed length, or already limited to the sizes required. If it were to
panic, it'd likely only be during development. A close inspection shows
no paths for a user to cause a panic currently.
This patches ends up being rather large, since it requires routing
errors back through functions which previously had no error returns.
Where possible I've tried to use helpers that reduce the verbosity
of frequently repeated stanzas, and to make the diffs as minimal as
possible.
Thanks to Marten Seemann for reporting this issue.
Fixes#58001
Fixes CVE-2022-41724
Change-Id: Ieb55867ef0a3e1e867b33f09421932510cb58851
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1679436
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
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Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/468125
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This change makes it easier for clients to debug mutual TLS connection failures. Currently, there are a few situations where invalid client auth leads to a generic "bad certificate" alert. 3 specific situations have a more appropriate TLS alert code, based on the alert descriptions in the appendix of both RFC5246 and RFC8446.
1. The server is configured to require client auth, but no client cert was provided; the appropriate alert is "certificate required". This applies only to TLS 1.3, which first defined the certificate_required alert code.
2. The client provided a cert that was signed by an authority that is not in the server's trusted set of CAs; the appropriate alert is "unknown certificate authority".
3. The client provided an expired (or not yet valid) cert; the appropriate alert is "expired certificate".
Otherwise, we still fall back to "bad certificate".
Fixes#52113
Change-Id: I7d5860fe911cad8a1615f16bfe488a37e936dc36
GitHub-Last-Rev: 34eeab5
GitHub-Pull-Request: #53251
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/410496
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
yuhan6665