When using ECH, do not include the PSK extension in the outer hello.
Including the PSK extension allows for a degradation in privacy, as an
on-path attacker can harvest outer client hellos, and then construct new
hellos using the PSK extension and arbitrary guessed SNI values,
replaying them to the target server. If the server rejects the PSK, the
handshake will continue, but if the PSK is accepted, the binder check
will fail.
Thanks to Coia Prant (github.com/rbqvq) for
reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2026-42505
Fixes#79282
Change-Id: Ib3a3c948106a57c1b07b9e61a58cbf757848be18
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/775960
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Bypass: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
ConnectionState.LocalCertificate is documented to be populated only for
connections which are not resumed. However, the TLS 1.0-1.2 server
handshake set it in processClientHello, which runs before
checkForResumption, and nothing cleared it on the abbreviated handshake
path. Resumed pre-1.3 server connections therefore reported a
certificate chain that was never presented to the peer (also visible to
VerifyConnection and WrapSession during the handshake).
Set the field in doFullHandshake, where the Certificate message is
actually written, so it is populated if and only if a chain was
presented. TLS 1.3 is unaffected because pickCertificate already returns
early for PSK resumption.
Also pin MaxVersion in TestLocalCertificate and
TestLocalCertificateResumption: they previously set only MinVersion, so
every pre-1.3 subtest silently negotiated TLS 1.3 and the broken path
had no coverage. With MaxVersion pinned, the resumption test fails
without this fix at TLS 1.0-1.2.
Verified: strengthened resumption test fails on unpatched master at TLS
1.0/1.1/1.2 and passes with the fix; full `go test crypto/tls` passes;
standalone repro from the issue prints len(LocalCertificate)=0 for
resumed TLS 1.2 connections.
Fixes#79967
Change-Id: Ic5586b05da956c619526b8ef500fcaa4c019a2f3
GitHub-Last-Rev: c2ef0f1
GitHub-Pull-Request: #79968
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/789862
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
When a TLS 1.3 client processes the server's encryptedExtensionsMsg it
should reject instances that contain duplicate extension types.
RFC 8446 §4.2 says:
There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type in a given
extension block.
This update matches enforcement done in the client hello unmarshalling,
but applied to the TLS 1.3 encrypted extensions message unmarshalling.
Making this change also allows enabling the
DuplicateExtensionClient-TLS-TLS13 BoGo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5d2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673757
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Previously if instances of the handshakeMessage interface returned false
from unmarshal(), indicating an umarshalling error, the crypto/tls
package would emit an unexpected_message alert. This commit changes to
use a decode_error alert for this condition instead.
The usage-pattern of the handshakeMessage interface is that we switch on
the message type, invoke a specific concrete handshakeMessage type's
unmarshal function, and then return it to the caller on success. At this
point the caller looks at the message type and can determine if the
message was unexpected or not. If it was unexpected, the call-sites emit
the correct error for that case. Only the caller knows the current
protocol state and allowed message types, not the generic handshake
decoding logic.
With the above in mind, if we find that within the unmarshal logic for
a specific message type that the data we have in hand doesn't match the
protocol syntax we should emit a decode_error. An unexpected_message
error isn't appropriate because we don't yet know if the message is
unexpected or not, only that the message can't be decoded based on the
spec's syntax for the type the message claimed to be.
Notably one unit test, TestQUICPostHandshakeKeyUpdate, had to have its
test data adjusted because it was previously not testing the right
thing: it was double-encoding the type & length prefix data for a key
update message and expecting the QUIC logic to reject it as an
inappropriate post-handshake message. In reality it was being rejected
sooner as an invalid key update message from the double-encoding and
this was masked by the previous alert for this condition matching the
expected alert.
Finally, changing our alert allows enabling a handful of BoGo tests
related to duplicate extensions of the form
"DuplicateExtension[Server|Client]-TLS-[TLS1|TLS11|TLS12|TLS13]". One
test remains skipped (DuplicateExtensionClient-TLS-TLS13), as it
requires additional follow-up.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5d1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673738
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This implements RFC 9155 by removing support for SHA-1 algorithms:
- we don't advertise them in ClientHello and CertificateRequest
(where supportedSignatureAlgorithms is used directly)
- we don't select them in our ServerKeyExchange and CertificateVerify
(where supportedSignatureAlgorithms filters signatureSchemesForCertificate)
- we reject them in the peer's ServerKeyExchange and CertificateVerify
(where we check against the algorithms we advertised in ClientHello
and CertificateRequest)
Fixes#72883
Change-Id: I6a6a4656e2aafd2c38cdd32090d3d8a9a8047818
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/658216
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
yuhan6665