When a TLS 1.3 client processes the server's encryptedExtensionsMsg it
should reject instances that contain duplicate extension types.
RFC 8446 §4.2 says:
There MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type in a given
extension block.
This update matches enforcement done in the client hello unmarshalling,
but applied to the TLS 1.3 encrypted extensions message unmarshalling.
Making this change also allows enabling the
DuplicateExtensionClient-TLS-TLS13 BoGo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5d2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673757
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Previously if instances of the handshakeMessage interface returned false
from unmarshal(), indicating an umarshalling error, the crypto/tls
package would emit an unexpected_message alert. This commit changes to
use a decode_error alert for this condition instead.
The usage-pattern of the handshakeMessage interface is that we switch on
the message type, invoke a specific concrete handshakeMessage type's
unmarshal function, and then return it to the caller on success. At this
point the caller looks at the message type and can determine if the
message was unexpected or not. If it was unexpected, the call-sites emit
the correct error for that case. Only the caller knows the current
protocol state and allowed message types, not the generic handshake
decoding logic.
With the above in mind, if we find that within the unmarshal logic for
a specific message type that the data we have in hand doesn't match the
protocol syntax we should emit a decode_error. An unexpected_message
error isn't appropriate because we don't yet know if the message is
unexpected or not, only that the message can't be decoded based on the
spec's syntax for the type the message claimed to be.
Notably one unit test, TestQUICPostHandshakeKeyUpdate, had to have its
test data adjusted because it was previously not testing the right
thing: it was double-encoding the type & length prefix data for a key
update message and expecting the QUIC logic to reject it as an
inappropriate post-handshake message. In reality it was being rejected
sooner as an invalid key update message from the double-encoding and
this was masked by the previous alert for this condition matching the
expected alert.
Finally, changing our alert allows enabling a handful of BoGo tests
related to duplicate extensions of the form
"DuplicateExtension[Server|Client]-TLS-[TLS1|TLS11|TLS12|TLS13]". One
test remains skipped (DuplicateExtensionClient-TLS-TLS13), as it
requires additional follow-up.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5d1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673738
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This implements RFC 9155 by removing support for SHA-1 algorithms:
- we don't advertise them in ClientHello and CertificateRequest
(where supportedSignatureAlgorithms is used directly)
- we don't select them in our ServerKeyExchange and CertificateVerify
(where supportedSignatureAlgorithms filters signatureSchemesForCertificate)
- we reject them in the peer's ServerKeyExchange and CertificateVerify
(where we check against the algorithms we advertised in ClientHello
and CertificateRequest)
Fixes#72883
Change-Id: I6a6a4656e2aafd2c38cdd32090d3d8a9a8047818
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/658216
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
If a ClientHello only supports TLS 1.3, or if a CertificateRequest is
sent after selecting TLS 1.3, we should not advertise TLS 1.2-only
signature_algorithms like PKCS#1 v1.5 or SHA-1.
However, since crypto/x509 still supports PKCS#1 v1.5, and a direct
CertPool match might not care about the signature in the certificate at
all, start sending a separate signature_algorithms_cert extension to
indicate support for PKCS#1 v1.5 and SHA-1 in certificates.
We were already correctly rejecting these algorithms if the peer
selected them in a TLS 1.3 connection.
Updates #72883
Change-Id: I6a6a4656ab60e1b7fb20fdedc32604dc156953ae
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/658215
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
When a pre-TLS 1.3 server processes a client hello message that
indicates compression methods that don't include the null compression
method, send an illegal parameter alert.
Previously we did this for TLS 1.3 server handshakes only, and the
legacy TLS versions used alertHandshakeFailure for this circumstance. By
switching this to alertIllegalParameter we use a consistent alert across
all TLS versions, and can also enable the NoNullCompression-TLS12 BoGo
test we were skipping.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5ce
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673736
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
When a crypto/tls client using TLS < 1.3 sends supported elliptic_curves
in a client hello message the server must limit itself to choosing one
of the supported options from our message. If we process a server key
exchange message that chooses an unadvertised curve, abort the
handshake w/ an error.
Previously we would not note that the server chose a curve we didn't
include in the client hello message, and would proceed with the
handshake as long as the chosen curve was one that we've implemented.
However, RFC 8422 5.1 makes it clear this is a server acting
out-of-spec, as it says:
If a server does not understand the Supported Elliptic Curves
Extension, does not understand the Supported Point Formats Extension,
or is unable to complete the ECC handshake while restricting itself
to the enumerated curves and point formats, it MUST NOT negotiate the
use of an ECC cipher suite.
Changing our behaviour to enforce this also allows enabling the
UnsupportedCurve BoGo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5cc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673735
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Previously the common Config.mutualVersion() code prioritized the
selected version based on the provided peerVersions being sent in peer
preference order.
Instead we would prefer to see TLS 1.3 used whenever it is
supported, even if the peer would prefer an older protocol version.
This commit updates mutualVersions() to implement this policy change.
Our new behaviour matches the behaviour of other TLS stacks, notably
BoringSSL, and so also allows enabling the IgnoreClientVersionOrder BoGo
test that we otherwise must skip.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5cb
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673236
Auto-Submit: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Uses the new weak package to replace the existing custom intern cache
with a map of weak.Pointers instead. This simplifies the cache, and
means we don't need to store a slice of handles on the Conn anymore.
Change-Id: I5c2bf6ef35fac4255e140e184f4e48574b34174c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/644176
TryBot-Bypass: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
I thought Golang will enforce fips140, but it seems not the intended.
Besides, hpke also is using cipher.NewGCM so we should be ok with it at the moment
If the client hello legacy version is >= TLS 1.3, and no
supported_versions extension is sent, negotiate TLS 1.2 or lower when
supported.
On the topic of supported version negotiation RFC 8446 4.2.1 indicates
TLS 1.3 implementations MUST send a supported_versions extension with
a list of their supported protocol versions. The crypto/tls package
enforces this when the client hello legacy version indicates TLS 1.3
(0x0304), aborting the handshake with an alertMissingExtension alert if
no supported_versions were received.
However, section 4.2.1 indicates different behaviour should be used when
the extension is not present and TLS 1.2 or prior are supported:
If this extension is not present, servers which are compliant with
this specification and which also support TLS 1.2 MUST negotiate
TLS 1.2 or prior as specified in [RFC5246], even if
ClientHello.legacy_version is 0x0304 or later.
This commit updates the client hello processing logic to allow this
behaviour. If no supported_versions extension was received we ignore the
legacy version being >= TLS 1.3 and instead negotiate a lower supported
version if the server configuration allows.
This fix in turn allows enabling the BoGo ClientHelloVersionTooHigh,
MinorVersionTolerance, and MajorVersionTolerance tests.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/671235
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Previously for protocol versions older than TLS 1.3 our server handshake
implementation sent an alertBadCertificate alert in the case where the
server TLS config indicates a client cert is required and none was
received.
This commit updates the relevant logic to instead send
alertHandshakeFailure in these circumstances.
For TLS 1.2, RFC 5246 §7.4.6 unambiguously describes this as the correct
alert:
If the client does not send any certificates, the
server MAY at its discretion either continue the handshake without
client authentication, or respond with a fatal handshake_failure
alert.
The TLS 1.1 and 1.0 specs also describe using this alert (RFC 4346 §7.4.6
and RFC 2246 §7.4.6) both say:
If client authentication is required by the server for the handshake
to continue, it may respond with a fatal handshake failure alert.
Making this correction also allows enabling the
RequireAnyClientCertificate-TLS1* bogo tests.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/671195
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Unlike in earlier TLS versions, in TLS 1.3 when processing a server
hello the legacy_compression_method MUST have the value 0. It is no
longer a parameter that offers a choice of compression method.
With this in mind, it seems more appropriate to return a decode error
when we encounter a non-zero compression method in a server hello
message. We haven't found a parameter value we reject, we've found
a message that doesn't decode according to its specification.
Making this change also aligns with BoringSSL and allows enabling the
TLS13-HRR-InvalidCompressionMethod bogo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/669156
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Previously if the clientHandshakeState for the TLS 1.2 client code
encountered a server helo message that contained a compression method
other than compressionNone, we would emit an unexpected message alert.
Instead, it seems more appropriate to return an illegal parameter alert.
The server hello message _was_ expected, it just contained a bad
parameter option.
Making this change also allows enabling the InvalidCompressionMethod
bogo test.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5c3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/669155
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Previously, the code only checked supportedVersions[0] for TLS 1.3
However, Chromium-based
browsers may list TLS 1.3 at different positions, causing ECH failures.
This fix:
Iterates through supportedVersions to accept connections as long as TLS 1.3 is present.
Improves ECH compatibility, ensuring Chrome, Edge, and other browsers work properly.
Fixes#71642
Change-Id: I32f4219fb6654d5cc22c7f33497c6142c0acb4f2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/648015
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
This required adding a new field to SessionState for TLS 1.0–1.2, since
the key exchange is not repeated on resumption. The additional field is
unfortunately not backwards compatible because current Go versions check
that the encoding has no extra data at the end, but will cause
cross-version tickets to be ignored. Relaxed that so we can add fields
in a backwards compatible way the next time.
For the cipher suite, we check that the session's is still acceptable
per the Config. That would arguably make sense here, too: if a Config
for example requires PQ, we should reject resumptions of connections
that didn't use PQ. However, that only applies to pre-TLS 1.3
connections, since in TLS 1.3 we always do a fresh key exchange on
resumption. Since PQ is the only main differentiator between key
exchanges (aside from off-by-default non-PFS RSA, which are controlled
by the cipher suite in TLS 1.0–1.2) and it's PQ-only, we can skip that
check.
Fixes#67516
Change-Id: I6a6a465681a6292edf66c7b8df8f4aba4171a76b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/653315
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
If we weren't resuming an existing session, and we constructed a TLS 1.3
compatible client hello, ensure the server doesn't echo back the
made up compatibility session ID if we end up handshaking for TLS 1.2.
As part of an effort to make the initial stages of a TLS 1.3 handshake
compatible with TLS 1.2 middleboxes, TLS 1.3 requires that the client
hello contain a non-empty legacy_session_id value. For anti-ossification
purposes it's recommended this ID be randomly generated. This is the
strategy the crypto/tls package takes.
When we follow this approach, but then end up negotiating TLS 1.2, the
server should not have echoed back that random ID to us. It's impossible
for the server to have had a session with a matching ID and so it is
misbehaving and it's prudent for our side to abort the handshake.
See RFC 8446 Section 4.1.2 for more detail:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#section-4.1.2
Adopting this behaviour allows un-ignoring the BoGo
EchoTLS13CompatibilitySessionID testcase.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I1e52075177a13a7aa103b45498eae38d8a4c34b9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/652997
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
For malformed client/server certificates in a TLS handshake send
a decode_error alert, matching BoringSSL behaviour.
Previously crypto/tls used a bad_certificate alert for this purpose.
The TLS specification is imprecise enough to allow this to be considered
a spec. justified choice, but since all other places in the protocol
encourage using decode_error for structurally malformed messages we may
as well do the same here and get some extra cross-impl consistency for
free.
This also allows un-ignoring the BoGo
GarbageCertificate-[Client|Server]-[TLS12|TLS13] tests.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: Ide45ba1602816e71c3289a60e77587266c3b9036
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/652995
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Junyang Shao <shaojunyang@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
When encountering alertUserCanceled in a TLS 1.3 handshake, ignore the
alert and retry reading a record. This matches existing logic for how
TLS 1.2 alertLevelWarning alerts are handled.
For broader context, TLS 1.3 removed warning-level alerts except for
alertUserCanceled (RFC 8446, § 6.1). Since at least one major
implementation (https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8323517)
misuses this alert, many TLS stacks now ignore it outright when seen in
a TLS 1.3 handshake (e.g. BoringSSL, NSS, Rustls).
With the crypto/tls behaviour changed to match peer implementations we
can now enable the "SendUserCanceledAlerts-TLS13" BoGo test.
"SendUserCanceledAlerts-TooMany-TLS13" remains ignored, because like
"SendWarningAlerts*" fixing the test requires some general spam
protocol message enhancements be done first.
Updates #72006
Change-Id: I570c1fa674b5a4760836c514d35ee17f746fe28d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/650716
Reviewed-by: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
The spec indicates that if a client sends an invalid ECHClientHello.type
in ClientHelloOuter, the server will abort the handshake with a
decode_error alert.
Define errInvalidECHExt for invalid ECHClientHello.type. If parseECHExt
returns an errInvalidECHExt error, Conn now sends an illegal_parameter
alert.
Fixes#71061.
Change-Id: I240241fe8bbe3e77d6ad1af989794647bfa2ff87
GitHub-Last-Rev: 3d6c233
GitHub-Pull-Request: #71062
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/639235
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
When ECH is rejected, properly take retry configs from the encrypted
extensions message. Also fix the bogo shim to properly test for this
behavior.
We should properly map the full BoringSSL -> Go errors so that we don't
run into a similar failure in the future, but this is left for a follow
up CL.
Fixes#70915
Change-Id: Icc1878ff6f87df059e7b83e0a431f50f1fea833c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/638583
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
This makes three related changes that work particularly well together
and would require significant extra work to do separately: it replaces
X25519Kyber768Draft00 with X25519MLKEM768, it makes CurvePreferences
ordering crypto/tls-selected, and applies a preference to PQ key
exchange methods over key shares (to mitigate downgrades).
TestHandshakeServerUnsupportedKeyShare was removed because we are not
rejecting unsupported key shares anymore (nor do we select them, and
rejecting them actively is a MAY). It would have been nice to keep the
test to check we still continue successfully, but testClientHelloFailure
is broken in the face of any server-side behavior which requires writing
any other messages back to the client, or reading them.
Updates #69985Fixes#69393
Change-Id: I58de76f5b8742a9bd4543fd7907c48e038507b19
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/630775
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Adds support for server-side ECH.
We make a couple of implementation decisions that are not completely
in-line with the spec. In particular, we don't enforce that the SNI
matches the ECHConfig public_name, and we implement a hybrid
shared/backend mode (rather than shared or split mode, as described in
Section 7). Both of these match the behavior of BoringSSL.
The hybrid server mode will either act as a shared mode server, where-in
the server accepts "outer" client hellos and unwraps them before
processing the "inner" hello, or accepts bare "inner" hellos initially.
This lets the server operate either transparently as a shared mode
server, or a backend server, in Section 7 terminology. This seems like
the best implementation choice for a TLS library.
Fixes#68500
Change-Id: Ife69db7c1886610742e95e76b0ca92587e6d7ed4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/623576
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Go 1.23 adds two new events to QUICConns: QUICStoreSessionEvent and
QUICResumeSessionEvent. We added a QUICConfig.EnableStoreSessionEvent
flag to control whether the store-session event is provided or not,
because receiving this event requires additional action from the caller:
the session must be explicitly stored with QUICConn.StoreSession.
We did not add a control for whether the resume-session event is
provided, because this event requires no action and the caller is
expected to ignore unknown events.
However, we never documented the expectation that callers ignore
unknown events, and quic-go produces an error when receiving an
unexpected event. So change the EnableStoreSessionEvent flag to
apply to both new events.
Fixes#68124
For #63691
Change-Id: I84af487e52b3815f7b648e09884608f8915cd645
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/594475
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Just like for tls.Config.GetCertificate the http.Server.ServeTLS method
should be checking tls.Config.GetConfigForClient before trying top open
the specified certFile/keyFile.
This was previously fixed for crypto/tls when using tls.Listen in
CL205059, but the same change for net/http was missed. I've added a
comment src/crypto/tls/tls.go in the relevant section in the hope that
any future changes of a similar nature consider will consider updating
net/http as needed as well.
Change-Id: I312303bc497d92aa2f4627fe2620c70779cbcc99
GitHub-Last-Rev: 6ed29a9
GitHub-Pull-Request: #66795
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/578396
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
Add linknames for most modules with ≥50 dependents.
Add linknames for a few other modules that we know
are important but are below 50.
Remove linknames from badlinkname.go that do not merit
inclusion (very small number of dependents).
We can add them back later if the need arises.
Fixes#67401. (For now.)
Change-Id: I1e49fec0292265256044d64b1841d366c4106002
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/587756
Auto-Submit: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Bypass: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>
This CL adds a (very opinionated) client-side ECH implementation.
In particular, if a user configures a ECHConfigList, by setting the
Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList, but we determine that none of
the configs are appropriate, we will not fallback to plaintext SNI, and
will instead return an error. It is then up to the user to decide if
they wish to fallback to plaintext themselves (by removing the config
list).
Additionally if Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList is provided, we
will not offer TLS support lower than 1.3, since negotiating any other
version, while offering ECH, is a hard error anyway. Similarly, if a
user wishes to fallback to plaintext SNI by using 1.2, they may do so
by removing the config list.
With regard to PSK GREASE, we match the boringssl behavior, which does
not include PSK identities/binders in the outer hello when doing ECH.
If the server rejects ECH, we will return a ECHRejectionError error,
which, if provided by the server, will contain a ECHConfigList in the
RetryConfigList field containing configs that should be used if the user
wishes to retry. It is up to the user to replace their existing
Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList with the retry config list.
Fixes#63369
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.golang.try:gotip-linux-amd64-longtest
Change-Id: I9bc373c044064221a647a388ac61624efd6bbdbf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/578575
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
I initially thought the logic was broken, but writing the test I
realized it was actually very clever (derogative). It was relying on the
outer loop continuing after a supported match without a key share,
allowing a later key share to override it (but not a later supported
match because of the "if selectedGroup != 0 { continue }").
Replaced the clever loop with two hopefully more understandable loops,
and added a test (which was already passing).
We were however not checking that the selected group is in the supported
list if we found it in key shares first. (This was only a MAY.) Fixed.
Fixes#65686
Change-Id: I09ea44f90167ffa36809deb78255ed039a217b6d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/586655
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
CL 585358 adds restrictions to disallow pull-only linknames
(currently off by default). Currently, there are quite some pull-
only linknames in user code in the wild. In order not to break
those, we add push linknames to allow them to be pulled. This CL
includes linknames found in a large code corpus (thanks Matthew
Dempsky and Michael Pratt for the analysis!), that are not
currently linknamed.
Updates #67401.
Change-Id: I32f5fc0c7a6abbd7a11359a025cfa2bf458fe767
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/586137
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
The check for fragmentary post-handshake messages in QUICConn.HandleData
was reversed, resulting in a potential panic when HandleData receives
a partial message.
In addition, HandleData wasn't checking the size of buffered
post-handshake messages. Produce an error when a post-handshake
message is larger than maxHandshake.
TestQUICConnectionState was using an onHandleCryptoData hook
in runTestQUICConnection that was never being called.
(I think it was inadvertently removed at some point while
the CL was in review.) Fix this test while making the hook
more general.
Fixes#62266
Change-Id: I210b70634e50beb456ab3977eb11272b8724c241
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/522595
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server
to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. Limit this by
restricting the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes to <=
8192 bits.
Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only
three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all
three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It
is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target
the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the
default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.
Thanks to Mateusz Poliwczak for reporting this issue.
Fixes#61460
Fixes CVE-2023-29409
Change-Id: Ie35038515a649199a36a12fc2c5df3af855dca6c
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1912161
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/515257
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Run-TryBot: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
yuhan6665