mirror of
https://github.com/XTLS/REALITY.git
synced 2026-09-28 01:48:07 +03:00
Gopls' new ptrtoerror analyzer (CL 798580) reports types E such that
both E and *E implement error and there is no clear intent as to
which one is preferred.
This CL cleans up nearly all such diagnostics in std by adding
explicit assertions such as 'var _ error = E{}'.
Two mistaken uses of scanner.Error (sans &) were fixed,
and several unnecessary embeddings of error in tests were
change to use a plain named field.
Change-Id: I1dbf4abd5750e69c34653a1cdd17fa04edfbc6e4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/800560
LUCI-TryBot-Result: golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Alan Donovan <adonovan@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Alan Donovan <adonovan@google.com>
852 lines
26 KiB
Go
852 lines
26 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE-Go file.
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// Server side implementation of REALITY protocol, a fork of package tls in latest Go.
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// For client side, please follow https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core/blob/main/transport/internet/reality/reality.go.
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// Package tls partially implements TLS 1.2, as specified in RFC 5246,
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// and TLS 1.3, as specified in RFC 8446.
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//
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// # FIPS 140-3 mode
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//
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// When the program is in [FIPS 140-3 mode], this package behaves as if only
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// SP 800-140C and SP 800-140D approved protocol versions, cipher suites,
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// signature algorithms, certificate public key types and sizes, and key
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// exchange and derivation algorithms were implemented. Others are silently
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// ignored and not negotiated, or rejected. This set may depend on the
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// algorithms supported by the FIPS 140-3 Go Cryptographic Module selected with
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// GOFIPS140, and may change across Go versions.
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//
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// [FIPS 140-3 mode]: https://go.dev/doc/security/fips140
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package reality
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// BUG(agl): The crypto/tls package only implements some countermeasures
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// against Lucky13 attacks on CBC-mode encryption, and only on SHA1
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// variants. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf and
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// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/mldsa"
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"crypto/mlkem"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/binary"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"os"
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"runtime"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/juju/ratelimit"
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"github.com/pires/go-proxyproto"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
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)
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type CloseWriteConn interface {
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net.Conn
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CloseWrite() error
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}
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type MirrorConn struct {
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*sync.Mutex
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net.Conn
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Target net.Conn
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}
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func (c *MirrorConn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
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c.Unlock()
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runtime.Gosched()
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n, err := c.Conn.Read(b)
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c.Lock() // calling c.Lock() before c.Target.Write(), to make sure that this goroutine has the priority to make the next move
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if n != 0 {
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c.Target.Write(b[:n])
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}
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if err != nil {
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c.Target.Close()
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}
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return n, err
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}
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func (c *MirrorConn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("Write(%v)", len(b))
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}
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func (c *MirrorConn) Close() error {
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return fmt.Errorf("Close()")
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}
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func (c *MirrorConn) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error {
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return nil
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}
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func (c *MirrorConn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error {
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return nil
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}
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func (c *MirrorConn) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error {
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return nil
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}
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type RatelimitedConn struct {
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net.Conn
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After int64
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Bucket *ratelimit.Bucket
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}
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func (c *RatelimitedConn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
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n, err := c.Conn.Read(b)
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if n != 0 {
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if c.After > 0 {
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c.After -= int64(n)
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} else {
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c.Bucket.Wait(int64(n))
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}
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}
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return n, err
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}
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func NewRatelimitedConn(conn net.Conn, limit *LimitFallback) net.Conn {
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if limit.BytesPerSec == 0 {
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return conn
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}
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burstBytesPerSec := limit.BurstBytesPerSec
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if burstBytesPerSec < limit.BytesPerSec {
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burstBytesPerSec = limit.BytesPerSec
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}
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return &RatelimitedConn{
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Conn: conn,
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After: int64(limit.AfterBytes),
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Bucket: ratelimit.NewBucketWithRate(float64(limit.BytesPerSec), int64(burstBytesPerSec)),
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}
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}
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var (
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size = 17 * 1024
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empty = make([]byte, size)
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types = [7]string{
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"Server Hello",
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"Change Cipher Spec",
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"Encrypted Extensions",
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"Certificate",
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"Certificate Verify",
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"Finished",
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"New Session Ticket",
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}
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)
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func Value(vals ...byte) (value int) {
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for i, val := range vals {
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value |= int(val) << ((len(vals) - i - 1) * 8)
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}
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return
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}
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// You MUST call `DetectPostHandshakeRecordsLens(config)` in advance manually
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// if you don't use REALITY's listener, e.g., Xray-core's RAW transport.
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func Server(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn, config *Config) (*Conn, error) {
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remoteAddr := conn.RemoteAddr().String()
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\n", remoteAddr)
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}
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target, err := config.DialContext(ctx, config.Type, config.Dest)
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if err != nil {
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conn.Close()
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return nil, errors.New("REALITY: failed to dial dest: " + err.Error())
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}
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if config.Xver == 1 || config.Xver == 2 {
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if _, err = proxyproto.HeaderProxyFromAddrs(config.Xver, conn.RemoteAddr(), conn.LocalAddr()).WriteTo(target); err != nil {
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target.Close()
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conn.Close()
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return nil, errors.New("REALITY: failed to send PROXY protocol: " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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raw := conn
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if pc, ok := conn.(*proxyproto.Conn); ok {
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raw = pc.Raw() // for TCP splicing in io.Copy()
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}
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underlying := raw.(CloseWriteConn) // *net.TCPConn or *net.UnixConn
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mutex := new(sync.Mutex)
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hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
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c: &Conn{
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conn: &MirrorConn{
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Mutex: mutex,
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Conn: conn,
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Target: target,
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},
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config: config,
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},
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ctx: context.Background(),
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}
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copying := false
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waitGroup := new(sync.WaitGroup)
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waitGroup.Add(2)
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go func() {
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for {
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mutex.Lock()
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hs.clientHello, _, err = hs.c.readClientHello(context.Background()) // TODO: Change some rules in this function.
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if copying || err != nil || hs.c.vers != VersionTLS13 || !config.ServerNames[hs.clientHello.serverName] {
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break
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}
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var peerPub, peerPub2 []byte
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for _, keyShare := range hs.clientHello.keyShares {
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if keyShare.group == X25519MLKEM768 && len(keyShare.data) == mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768+32 {
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if peerPub2 != nil {
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peerPub2 = nil // ensure fail
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break // ensure once
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}
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peerPub2 = keyShare.data[mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768:]
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continue // fast continue
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}
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if keyShare.group == X25519 && len(keyShare.data) == 32 {
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if peerPub != nil {
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peerPub2 = nil // ensure fail
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break // ensure once
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}
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peerPub = keyShare.data
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break // ensure order
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}
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}
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if peerPub2 == nil {
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break // reject outdated/strange Client Hello that doesn't have X25519MLKEM768 before optional X25519
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}
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if peerPub == nil {
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peerPub = peerPub2 // secondary choice: X25519 in X25519MLKEM768
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}
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for peerPub != nil {
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if hs.c.AuthKey, err = curve25519.X25519(config.PrivateKey, peerPub); err != nil {
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break
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}
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if _, err = hkdf.New(sha256.New, hs.c.AuthKey, hs.clientHello.random[:20], []byte("REALITY")).Read(hs.c.AuthKey); err != nil {
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break
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}
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block, _ := aes.NewCipher(hs.c.AuthKey)
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aead, _ := cipher.NewGCM(block)
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ths.c.AuthKey[:16]: %v\tAEAD: %T\n", remoteAddr, hs.c.AuthKey[:16], aead)
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}
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ciphertext := make([]byte, 32)
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plainText := make([]byte, 32)
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copy(ciphertext, hs.clientHello.sessionId)
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copy(hs.clientHello.sessionId, plainText) // hs.clientHello.sessionId points to hs.clientHello.raw[39:]
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if _, err = aead.Open(plainText[:0], hs.clientHello.random[20:], ciphertext, hs.clientHello.original); err != nil {
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break
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}
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copy(hs.clientHello.sessionId, ciphertext)
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copy(hs.c.ClientVer[:], plainText)
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hs.c.ClientTime = time.Unix(int64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(plainText[4:])), 0)
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copy(hs.c.ClientShortId[:], plainText[8:])
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ths.c.ClientVer: %v\n", remoteAddr, hs.c.ClientVer)
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ths.c.ClientTime: %v\n", remoteAddr, hs.c.ClientTime)
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ths.c.ClientShortId: %v\n", remoteAddr, hs.c.ClientShortId)
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}
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if (config.MinClientVer == nil || Value(hs.c.ClientVer[:]...) >= Value(config.MinClientVer...)) &&
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(config.MaxClientVer == nil || Value(hs.c.ClientVer[:]...) <= Value(config.MaxClientVer...)) &&
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(config.MaxTimeDiff == 0 || time.Since(hs.c.ClientTime).Abs() <= config.MaxTimeDiff) &&
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(config.ShortIds[hs.c.ClientShortId]) {
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hs.c.conn = conn
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}
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break
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}
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ths.c.conn == conn: %v\n", remoteAddr, hs.c.conn == conn)
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}
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break
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}
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mutex.Unlock()
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if hs.c.conn != conn {
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if config.Show && hs.clientHello != nil {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\tforwarded SNI: %v\n", remoteAddr, hs.clientHello.serverName)
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}
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_, err := io.Copy(target, NewRatelimitedConn(underlying, &config.LimitFallbackUpload))
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// close target writer when received FIN (err==nil)
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if err == nil {
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targetWriterCloser, ok := target.(CloseWriteConn)
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if ok {
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targetWriterCloser.CloseWrite()
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}
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} else {
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// Close target when encountering RST (or any other errors)
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target.Close()
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}
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}
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waitGroup.Done()
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}()
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go func() {
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s2cSaved := make([]byte, 0, size)
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buf := make([]byte, size)
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handshakeLen := 0
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f:
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for {
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runtime.Gosched()
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n, err := target.Read(buf)
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if n == 0 {
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if err != nil {
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conn.Close()
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waitGroup.Done()
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return
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}
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continue
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}
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mutex.Lock()
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s2cSaved = append(s2cSaved, buf[:n]...)
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if hs.c.conn != conn {
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copying = true // if the target already sent some data, just start bidirectional direct forwarding
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break
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}
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if len(s2cSaved) > size {
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break
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}
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for i, t := range types {
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if hs.c.out.handshakeLen[i] != 0 {
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continue
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}
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if i == 6 && len(s2cSaved) == 0 {
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break
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}
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if handshakeLen == 0 && len(s2cSaved) > recordHeaderLen {
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if Value(s2cSaved[1:3]...) != VersionTLS12 ||
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(i == 0 && (recordType(s2cSaved[0]) != recordTypeHandshake || s2cSaved[5] != typeServerHello)) ||
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(i == 1 && (recordType(s2cSaved[0]) != recordTypeChangeCipherSpec || s2cSaved[5] != 1)) ||
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(i > 1 && recordType(s2cSaved[0]) != recordTypeApplicationData) {
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break f
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}
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handshakeLen = recordHeaderLen + Value(s2cSaved[3:5]...)
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}
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\tlen(s2cSaved): %v\t%v: %v\n", remoteAddr, len(s2cSaved), t, handshakeLen)
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}
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if handshakeLen > size { // too long
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break f
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}
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if i == 1 && handshakeLen > 0 && handshakeLen != 6 {
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break f
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}
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if i == 2 && handshakeLen > 512 {
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hs.c.out.handshakeLen[i] = handshakeLen
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hs.c.out.handshakeBuf = buf[:0]
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break
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}
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if i == 6 && handshakeLen > 0 {
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hs.c.out.handshakeLen[i] = handshakeLen
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break
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}
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if handshakeLen == 0 || len(s2cSaved) < handshakeLen {
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mutex.Unlock()
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continue f
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}
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if i == 0 {
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hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
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if !hs.hello.unmarshal(s2cSaved[recordHeaderLen:handshakeLen]) ||
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hs.hello.vers != VersionTLS12 || hs.hello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 ||
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cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.hello.cipherSuite) == nil ||
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(!(hs.hello.serverShare.group == X25519 && len(hs.hello.serverShare.data) == 32) &&
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!(hs.hello.serverShare.group == X25519MLKEM768 && len(hs.hello.serverShare.data) == mlkem.CiphertextSize768+32)) {
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break f
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}
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}
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hs.c.out.handshakeLen[i] = handshakeLen
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s2cSaved = s2cSaved[handshakeLen:]
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handshakeLen = 0
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}
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start := time.Now()
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err = hs.handshake()
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ths.handshake() err: %v\n", remoteAddr, err)
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}
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if err != nil {
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break
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}
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go func() { // TODO: Probe some time-outs in advance.
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if handshakeLen-len(s2cSaved) > 0 {
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io.ReadFull(target, buf[:handshakeLen-len(s2cSaved)])
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}
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if n, err := target.Read(buf); !hs.c.isHandshakeComplete.Load() {
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if err != nil {
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conn.Close()
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}
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ttime.Since(start): %v\tn: %v\terr: %v\n", remoteAddr, time.Since(start), n, err)
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}
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}
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}()
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err = hs.readClientFinished()
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ths.readClientFinished() err: %v\n", remoteAddr, err)
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}
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if err != nil {
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break
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}
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for {
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key := config.Dest + " " + hs.clientHello.serverName
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if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) == 0 {
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key += " 0"
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} else if hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols[0] == "h2" {
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key += " 2"
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} else {
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key += " 1"
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}
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if val, ok := GlobalPostHandshakeRecordsLens.Load(key); ok {
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if postHandshakeRecordsLens, ok := val.([]int); ok {
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for _, length := range postHandshakeRecordsLens {
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plainText := make([]byte, length-16)
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plainText[0] = 23
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plainText[1] = 3
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plainText[2] = 3
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plainText[3] = byte((length - 5) >> 8)
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plainText[4] = byte((length - 5))
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plainText[5] = 23
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postHandshakeRecord := hs.c.out.cipher.(aead).Seal(plainText[:5], hs.c.out.seq[:], plainText[5:], plainText[:5])
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hs.c.out.incSeq()
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hs.c.write(postHandshakeRecord)
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\tlen(postHandshakeRecord): %v\n", remoteAddr, len(postHandshakeRecord))
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}
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}
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break
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}
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}
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time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
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if maxUseless, ok := GlobalMaxCSSMsgCount.Load(key); ok {
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hs.c.MaxUselessRecords = maxUseless.(int)
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}
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}
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hs.c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
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break
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}
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mutex.Unlock()
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if hs.c.out.handshakeLen[0] == 0 { // if the target sent an incorrect Server Hello, or before that
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if hs.c.conn == conn { // if we processed the Client Hello successfully but the target did not
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waitGroup.Add(1)
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go func() {
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io.Copy(target, NewRatelimitedConn(underlying, &config.LimitFallbackUpload))
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waitGroup.Done()
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}()
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}
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conn.Write(s2cSaved)
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io.Copy(underlying, NewRatelimitedConn(target, &config.LimitFallbackDownload))
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// Here is bidirectional direct forwarding:
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// client ---underlying--- server ---target--- dest
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// Call `underlying.CloseWrite()` once `io.Copy()` returned
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underlying.CloseWrite()
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}
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waitGroup.Done()
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}()
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|
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waitGroup.Wait()
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target.Close()
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if config.Show {
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fmt.Printf("REALITY remoteAddr: %v\ths.c.isHandshakeComplete.Load(): %v\n", remoteAddr, hs.c.isHandshakeComplete.Load())
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}
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if hs.c.isHandshakeComplete.Load() {
|
|
return hs.c, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn.Close()
|
|
var failureReason string
|
|
if hs.clientHello == nil {
|
|
failureReason = "failed to read client hello"
|
|
} else if hs.c.vers != VersionTLS13 {
|
|
failureReason = fmt.Sprintf("unsupported TLS version: %x", hs.c.vers)
|
|
} else if !config.ServerNames[hs.clientHello.serverName] {
|
|
failureReason = fmt.Sprintf("server name mismatch: %s", hs.clientHello.serverName)
|
|
} else if hs.c.conn != conn {
|
|
failureReason = "authentication failed or validation criteria not met"
|
|
} else if hs.c.out.handshakeLen[0] == 0 {
|
|
failureReason = "target sent incorrect server hello or handshake incomplete"
|
|
} else {
|
|
failureReason = "handshake did not complete successfully"
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("REALITY: processed invalid connection from %s: %s", remoteAddr, failureReason)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
c := &Conn{
|
|
conn: conn,
|
|
config: config,
|
|
}
|
|
c.handshakeFn = c.serverHandshake
|
|
return c
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Client returns a new TLS client side connection
|
|
// using conn as the underlying transport.
|
|
// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or
|
|
// InsecureSkipVerify in the config.
|
|
func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn {
|
|
c := &Conn{
|
|
conn: conn,
|
|
config: config,
|
|
isClient: true,
|
|
}
|
|
c.handshakeFn = c.clientHandshake
|
|
return c
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections.
|
|
type listener struct {
|
|
net.Listener
|
|
config *Config
|
|
conns chan net.Conn
|
|
err error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection.
|
|
// The returned connection is of type *Conn.
|
|
func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
|
|
/*
|
|
c, err := l.Listener.Accept()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return Server(c, l.config), nil
|
|
*/
|
|
if c, ok := <-l.conns; ok {
|
|
return c, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, l.err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner
|
|
// Listener and wraps each connection with [Server].
|
|
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
|
|
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
|
|
func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config) net.Listener {
|
|
go DetectPostHandshakeRecordsLens(config)
|
|
l := new(listener)
|
|
l.Listener = inner
|
|
l.config = config
|
|
{
|
|
l.conns = make(chan net.Conn)
|
|
go func() {
|
|
for {
|
|
c, err := l.Listener.Accept()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
l.err = err
|
|
close(l.conns)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
go func() {
|
|
defer func() { recover() }()
|
|
c, err = Server(context.Background(), c, l.config)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
l.conns <- c
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
return l
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Listen creates a TLS listener accepting connections on the
|
|
// given network address using net.Listen.
|
|
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
|
|
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
|
|
func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config) (net.Listener, error) {
|
|
// If this condition changes, consider updating http.Server.ServeTLS too.
|
|
if config == nil || len(config.Certificates) == 0 &&
|
|
config.GetCertificate == nil && config.GetConfigForClient == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates, GetCertificate, nor GetConfigForClient set in Config")
|
|
}
|
|
l, err := net.Listen(network, laddr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return NewListener(l, config), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type timeoutError struct{}
|
|
|
|
var _ error = timeoutError{}
|
|
|
|
func (timeoutError) Error() string { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" }
|
|
func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true }
|
|
func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true }
|
|
|
|
// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and
|
|
// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any
|
|
// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS
|
|
// handshake as a whole.
|
|
//
|
|
// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero
|
|
// configuration; see the documentation of [Config] for the defaults.
|
|
//
|
|
// DialWithDialer uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
|
|
// use [Dialer.DialContext] with NetDialer set to the desired dialer.
|
|
func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) {
|
|
return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) {
|
|
if netDialer.Timeout != 0 {
|
|
var cancel context.CancelFunc
|
|
ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, netDialer.Timeout)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !netDialer.Deadline.IsZero() {
|
|
var cancel context.CancelFunc
|
|
ctx, cancel = context.WithDeadline(ctx, netDialer.Deadline)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rawConn, err := netDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":")
|
|
if colonPos == -1 {
|
|
colonPos = len(addr)
|
|
}
|
|
hostname := addr[:colonPos]
|
|
|
|
if config == nil {
|
|
config = defaultConfig()
|
|
}
|
|
// If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName
|
|
// from the hostname we're connecting to.
|
|
if config.ServerName == "" {
|
|
// Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default.
|
|
c := config.Clone()
|
|
c.ServerName = hostname
|
|
config = c
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn := Client(rawConn, config)
|
|
if err := conn.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
|
|
rawConn.Close()
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return conn, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial
|
|
// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting
|
|
// TLS connection.
|
|
// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to
|
|
// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config
|
|
// for the defaults.
|
|
func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) {
|
|
return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Dialer dials TLS connections given a configuration and a Dialer for the
|
|
// underlying connection.
|
|
type Dialer struct {
|
|
// NetDialer is the optional dialer to use for the TLS connections'
|
|
// underlying TCP connections.
|
|
// A nil NetDialer is equivalent to the net.Dialer zero value.
|
|
NetDialer *net.Dialer
|
|
|
|
// Config is the TLS configuration to use for new connections.
|
|
// A nil configuration is equivalent to the zero
|
|
// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the
|
|
// defaults.
|
|
Config *Config
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Dial connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
|
|
// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
|
|
//
|
|
// The returned [Conn], if any, will always be of type *[Conn].
|
|
//
|
|
// Dial uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
|
|
// use [Dialer.DialContext].
|
|
func (d *Dialer) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
|
|
return d.DialContext(context.Background(), network, addr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (d *Dialer) netDialer() *net.Dialer {
|
|
if d.NetDialer != nil {
|
|
return d.NetDialer
|
|
}
|
|
return new(net.Dialer)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DialContext connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
|
|
// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
|
|
//
|
|
// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before
|
|
// the connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully
|
|
// connected, any expiration of the context will not affect the
|
|
// connection.
|
|
//
|
|
// The returned [Conn], if any, will always be of type *[Conn].
|
|
func (d *Dialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
|
|
c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Don't return c (a typed nil) in an interface.
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return c, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LoadX509KeyPair reads and parses a public/private key pair from a pair of
|
|
// files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file may
|
|
// contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to form a
|
|
// certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be populated.
|
|
func LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) {
|
|
certPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(certFile)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return Certificate{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
keyPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(keyFile)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return Certificate{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of
|
|
// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be populated.
|
|
func X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) {
|
|
fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err }
|
|
|
|
var cert Certificate
|
|
var skippedBlockTypes []string
|
|
for {
|
|
var certDERBlock *pem.Block
|
|
certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock)
|
|
if certDERBlock == nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
|
|
cert.Certificate = append(cert.Certificate, certDERBlock.Bytes)
|
|
} else {
|
|
skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
|
|
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input"))
|
|
}
|
|
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched"))
|
|
}
|
|
return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skippedBlockTypes = skippedBlockTypes[:0]
|
|
var keyDERBlock *pem.Block
|
|
for {
|
|
keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock)
|
|
if keyDERBlock == nil {
|
|
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input"))
|
|
}
|
|
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key"))
|
|
}
|
|
return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
|
|
}
|
|
if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway
|
|
// to check that it looks sane and matches the private key.
|
|
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fail(err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert.Leaf = x509Cert
|
|
|
|
cert.PrivateKey, err = parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fail(err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
|
|
}
|
|
if !priv.PublicKey.Equal(pub) {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
|
|
}
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
|
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
|
|
}
|
|
if !priv.PublicKey.Equal(pub) {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
|
|
}
|
|
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
|
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
|
|
}
|
|
if !priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey).Equal(pub) {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
|
|
}
|
|
case *mldsa.PublicKey:
|
|
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*mldsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
|
|
}
|
|
if !priv.PublicKey().Equal(pub) {
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return fail(errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm"))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return cert, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
|
|
// PKCS #1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS #8 keys.
|
|
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
|
|
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) {
|
|
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der)
|
|
pkcs8Err := err // Return the PKCS#8 error if all parsing attempts fail.
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
key, err = x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
key, err = x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to parse private key: %w", pkcs8Err)
|
|
}
|
|
switch key := key.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, ed25519.PrivateKey, *mldsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: found unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|