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crypto/tls: don't advertise TLS 1.2-only sigAlgs in TLS 1.3
If a ClientHello only supports TLS 1.3, or if a CertificateRequest is sent after selecting TLS 1.3, we should not advertise TLS 1.2-only signature_algorithms like PKCS#1 v1.5 or SHA-1. However, since crypto/x509 still supports PKCS#1 v1.5, and a direct CertPool match might not care about the signature in the certificate at all, start sending a separate signature_algorithms_cert extension to indicate support for PKCS#1 v1.5 and SHA-1 in certificates. We were already correctly rejecting these algorithms if the peer selected them in a TLS 1.3 connection. Updates #72883 Change-Id: I6a6a4656ab60e1b7fb20fdedc32604dc156953ae Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/658215 Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org> Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com> Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
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+43
-15
@@ -23,23 +23,51 @@ func defaultCurvePreferences() []CurveID {
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return []CurveID{X25519MLKEM768, X25519, CurveP256, CurveP384, CurveP521}
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}
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// defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms contains the signature and hash algorithms that
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// the code advertises as supported in a TLS 1.2+ ClientHello and in a TLS 1.2+
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// defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms returns the signature and hash algorithms that
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// the code advertises and supports in a TLS 1.2+ ClientHello and in a TLS 1.2+
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// CertificateRequest. The two fields are merged to match with TLS 1.3.
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// Note that in TLS 1.2, the ECDSA algorithms are not constrained to P-256, etc.
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var defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms = []SignatureScheme{
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PSSWithSHA256,
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ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
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Ed25519,
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PSSWithSHA384,
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PSSWithSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA256,
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PKCS1WithSHA384,
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PKCS1WithSHA512,
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ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
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ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA1,
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ECDSAWithSHA1,
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func defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms() []SignatureScheme {
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return []SignatureScheme{
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PSSWithSHA256,
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ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
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Ed25519,
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PSSWithSHA384,
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PSSWithSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA256,
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PKCS1WithSHA384,
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PKCS1WithSHA512,
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ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
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ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA1,
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ECDSAWithSHA1,
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}
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}
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// defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert returns the signature algorithms that
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// the code advertises as supported for signatures in certificates.
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//
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// We include all algorithms, including SHA-1 and PKCS#1 v1.5, because it's more
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// likely that something on our side will be willing to accept a *-with-SHA1
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// certificate (e.g. with a custom VerifyConnection or by a direct match with
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// the CertPool), than that the peer would have a better certificate but is just
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// choosing not to send it. crypto/x509 will refuse to verify important SHA-1
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// signatures anyway.
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func defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert() []SignatureScheme {
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return []SignatureScheme{
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PSSWithSHA256,
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ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
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Ed25519,
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PSSWithSHA384,
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PSSWithSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA256,
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PKCS1WithSHA384,
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PKCS1WithSHA512,
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ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
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ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA1,
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ECDSAWithSHA1,
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}
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}
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//var tlsrsakex = godebug.New("tlsrsakex")
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